Prove They Are Alive!
  For Democracy and Human Rights in Turkmenistan
26.06.2017  
English

02.02.2017
Turkmenistan at Twenty-Five:
The High Price of Authoritarianism

Paul Stronski

Turkmenistans political model appears far more fragile than the record after twentyfive years of independence might lead one to believe.

Twentyfive years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan holds the title of the most authoritarian of all former Soviet states. Saparmurat Niyazov, the countrys last Soviet and first postSoviet leader, created a political system based on repression and hydrocarbon wealth. He used the proceeds from Turkmenistans vast natural gas reserves to finance an internal security apparatus, an omnipresent propaganda machine, and a measure of material wellbeing for the population through deep subsidies for the basic necessities of life.

His successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, has followed in Niyazovs footsteps faithfully, perpetuating the system he inherited and making it more oppressive and closed wherever possible. Freedom of speech, the press, association, and religion remain curtailed in Turkmenistan to such an extent that Freedom House puts the country in the same category of dictatorships as North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, at the very bottom of its 2016 Freedom in the World index. The ability of Turkmen to travel overseas is restricted, and the country remains largely closed off to most foreigners, making it the most isolated of all former Soviet states.

But the hermit kingdom financed by gas revenues is facing big challenges as the security environment deteriorates and the countrys financial resources dwindle. There has recently been instability along the AfghanTurkmen frontier, and Turkmen security forces have reportedly had difficulty pushing back militant incursions across the border. Meanwhile, low commodity prices have taken their toll on all of Eurasias hydrocarbon exporters, but Turkmenistans political isolation and reputation as one of the most oppressive regimes compound the countrys problems.

Over the past decade, Ashgabat has grown increasingly dependent on Beijingnow the only real export market for Turkmen gas. China is also the countrys main source of foreign loans. Both provide China with enormous leverage over Turkmenistan. The prospect of a prolonged environment of low hydrocarbon prices, the countrys outstanding debt to China, and competition from other global gas producers make Turkmenistans economy increasingly troubled.

Due to fractious relations with Moscow and the desire of the Turkmen government to keep its citizens isolated from the outside world, migrant labor opportunities in Russia have been closed off. That has denied struggling Turkmen the escape valve other Central Asians have relied on to feed their families and remain above the poverty line. Turkmenistan has already experienced reduced revenues from gas sales, a steep devaluation of its currency, high inflation, and shortages of basic goods, raising concerns about food security. There have been isolated instances of socioeconomic protest in recent years, which is unusual for a population living under such repression and in an information vacuum. The Turkmen model appears far more fragile than the record of the first twentyfive years of independence might lead one to believe.

The Turkmen Political Model

Niyazov, Turkmenistans first president, found himself running an independent country by chance, not design. Trained as an engineer in St. Petersburg, then Leningrad, he came to power in 1985 when then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev installed him as first secretary of the Communist Party of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic with a mandate to curb corruption there.

Niyazov, however, was a conservative Soviet official, and Turkmenistan in the late 1980s was a conservative place. Like most of Central Asia, the republic produced no largescale popular independence movement during Gorbachevs perestroika years. The population was not eager to break away from Moscow. Turkmen voted overwhelmingly in a March 1991 Soviet Unionwide referendum to preserve the union. In keeping with that conservativism, Niyazov remained silent throughout the August 1991 coup when hardliners attempted to overthrow Gorbachev and save the Soviet Union.

Turkmenistan therefore did not experience the political liberalization that swept across most of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. In 1990, Niyazov banned the nationalist Unity movement, which urged a revival of Turkmen culture at a time when civil society and other national revival movements were not only tolerated but blossoming in other parts of the Soviet Union. Because the people of Turkmenistan had never experienced either political or cultural liberalization, when the Soviet Union finally broke up, Niyazov had little difficulty transforming Turkmenistan from oneparty Communist rule to oneparty rule of the newly renamed Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, the successor to the Communists. This enabled Turkmen elites to preserve the power and institutional capacity of the Communist Party. They merely changed the ideological cover from socialism to a newly discovered reverence for Turkmen nationalism, with Niyazov as its chief proponent. That nationalism eventually led to the glorification of Niyazov as Turkmenbashi, the leader of all Turkmen.

Turkmenistan has never had an election that offered its citizens any semblance of choice. Niyazov ran for president unopposed in 1992, winning an implausible 99.5 percent of the vote. In 1994, he became the first leader of a former Soviet state to extend his term in office by holding a referendum to prolong his rule until 2002 setting a precedent that Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan would all follow. Niyazov was then proclaimed president for life in 1999, doing away with presidential elections until his sudden death in 2006.

During Niyazovs time in office, all dissent was brutally suppressed and pushed underground. The media remained under tight state control, freedom of movement restricted, and access to the outside world highly constrained. In an effort to promote Turkmen nationalism and reduce Russian influence in the country, Niyazov discouraged the use of Russian, closed Russianlanguage schools, reduced Russianlanguage instruction to one hour a week, and blocked Russianlanguage media. He later curtailed access to Russianlanguage material in the national library. These moves effectively cut the country off from outside information and reduced Moscows ability to influence Turkmen culture and information space.

Secondary education under Niyazov was reduced by one yeara move that caused longterm damage to the quality of education in the country, weakened the qualifications of Turkmen secondary school graduates, and cut off opportunities for Turkmen to study in Russia or elsewhere overseas. Ethnic Russians were dismissed from workplaces, while those holding dual RussianTurkmen citizenship were given three months to renounce their Russian citizenship in 2003 or face the confiscation of their property and forced departure from the country. Foreigneducated Turkmen citizensincluding those with Sovietera degrees from institutions elsewhere in the Soviet Unionwere dismissed from their jobs in 2004.

In the same year, the government fired 15,000 healthcare professionals, replacing them with military conscripts with little medical training. In 2005, Niyazov ordered the closure of all regional hospitals.

These moves further weakened the education and healthcare systems in Turkmenistan, undermined the effectiveness of the countrys institutions, and led to a massive brain drain of ethnic Russians, some Russianspeaking Turkmen elites, and minority groups. That caused friction with Moscow and further tarnished Turkmenistans image abroad.

With the population isolated from the outside world, the regime tried to transform a clan and tribebased society into a nation centered on a single political leader through the creation of Niyazovs personality cult. The regimes propaganda arm instructed the population to revere the leader, his family background, and his alleged achievements. The capital of Ashgabat, like many other towns, was redeveloped and decorated with gold images of the leader, expensive imported marble, and elaborate fountainsa wasteful misuse of water in a desert country that has too little of it. When the names of the months were changed in honor of Niyazovs family members, the cult went from lavish to outright bizarre. Library collections were purged and most libraries were eventually closed, limiting public access to books and information from the Soviet era. Instead, schoolchildren were required to read the Rukhnama, Niyazovs collected thoughts on culture, history, and morality.

While the state propaganda machine built up an image of Niyazov as a godlike figure leading a revitalized Turkmen nation, the population received social benefits: free water, gas, and electricity as well as subsidized bread, gasoline, and public transportation. In case the propaganda and subsidies failed, the personality cult was accompanied by the buildup of a powerful domestic security apparatus. Turkmenistan in effect became a police state more reminiscent of the Stalin era than anything seen in the later Soviet period.

Turkmenistans adoption of permanent neutralityconfirmed by the United Nations in 1995helped reorient the security services and military focus away from the danger of external aggression toward internal threats to the regime. An intense focus on preserving the regime and protecting it from internal threats has likely degraded the Turkmen militarys ability to identify external threats and protect the country from them. That is now a problem, given rising instability in northern Afghanistan near the Turkmen border, fears of the presence of the selfproclaimed Islamic State, and Russias propensity of late to use its military power in Eurasia and the Middle East.

Niyazov appeared wary of any potential challenger from within the political elitea fear that led to frequent purges of government officials to prevent any one person or faction from gaining too much political or economic power. Due to these purges, it was common for former senior government officials to find themselves out of favor, ultimately either in jail or in exile. The end result was that even a notional opposition could exist only outside the country. An alleged assassination and coup attempt against Niyazov in November 2002 led to a purge of the political elite and security services and reinforced the regimes penchant for isolation from the outside world. While the details of the plot remain murky, the regime implausibly accused Azerbaijan, Russia, the United States, and Uzbekistan of complicity. The minister of defense, former minister of foreign affairs, head of the security services, and head of the presidential administration, among others, were all put through show trials and sentenced to long jail terms. Dispatched to prison camps, many of them have not surfaced since. They are the highestprofile victims of Turkmen totalitarianism, but many others have also disappeared into the countrys prison and labor camps.

Few Changes Under the Second President

Niyazov died of a heart attack in December 2006. Despite expectations that his demise would unleash political instability, the transition to his successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, was remarkably smoothbut nontransparent. A minister of health and a deputy prime minister, he was not in the formal line of succession and came to power through behindthescenes maneuvering within the elite. Officially, the parliamentary speaker was supposed to become acting president, but he was arrested and imprisoned shortly after Niyazovs death. A quickly amended constitution enabled Berdimuhamedov to become acting head of state. He was confirmed as president in a highly flawed February 2007 election, and returned to power in 2012 with an unrealistic 97 percent of the vote.

In 2016, Berdimuhamedov pushed through constitutional amendments extending the presidential term to seven years and removing a mandatory retirement age of seventy for the president, essentially setting himself up to serve as head of state indefinitely. The next presidential election will be held in February 2017, with the current president certain to win once again, despite the fact that two new political parties are also fielding candidates. Berdimuhamedov replaced Niyazovs cult with his own, based on the same blueprint. Portraits of the second president are now ubiquitous throughout the country on billboards and in offices. Berdimuhamedov enjoys his own honorific title of arkadaq or protector. He has become a frequent author; one of his books recently became mandatory reading in the countrys schools, while his predecessors Rukhnama has been dropped from the curriculum.

A gold statue of the second president was erected in Ashgabat, purportedly following the will of the Turkmen people. The reconstruction of the capital continues unabated with little regard to property rights or the environment. Much of the construction consists of prestige projects, such as the new USD 2.3 billion Ashgabat airporta costly and wasteful building for a country that restricts the movement of its citizens and has virtually no foreign tourism and few foreign investors. Despite the high price tag, the airport is marred by shoddy construction. Opened only in September 2016, the building already has sagging foundations and failing communication cables.

This troubled airport will welcome athletes for the 2017 Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games in Ashgabatan international sports event of which most of the world is unaware. Held only once before in South Korea, the games in Turkmenistan will cost an estimated USD 5 billionanother questionable prestige project. The government is also building a lavish tourist zone on the Caspian Sea, even though it is very hard for foreign tourists to gain visas to the country.

Freedom of movement is tightly controlled. Although Berdimuhamedov took away exit visa requirements for citizens to travel abroad, he allegedly replaced them with a secret blacklist of thosemost likely regime critics who are banned from traveling abroad, even to Russia. Furthermore, most ordinary Turkmen cannot afford the costs of regional, let alone international, travel. Turkmen civil society remains repressed, as does independent journalism. The media space is fully controlled by the government, which also banned satellite dishes in 2015 in an attempt to impede foreign media broadcasts into Turkmenistan. The few independent journalists who continue to work in the country are harassed, attacked, and arrested, including local Turkmen employees of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and other international news outlets. Internet penetration is estimated at 14.9 percent of the populationa figure that places Turkmenistan far below the average for former Soviet states and even 5 percentage points behind Laos, Myanmar, and Nepal. Opposition websites and socialmedia platforms based outside the country are blocked, although Internetsavvy Turkmen can access them through proxy servers. To prevent the flow of unsanctioned information, the state at times also causes Internet and cellular service outages. The high costs of accessing the Internet and careful monitoring of Internet use in cafés and homes further limits its availability. Given these preclusions, Freedom House does not even provide a rating for Turkmenistan in its Freedom of the Net index.

Corruption remains widespread, encompassing all levels of government and the elite around the president. Foreign investors often have to pay to play, ensnaring several European companies in international corruption probes. Turkmenistan ranks 154 out of 176 countries in Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index. Corruption and poor adherence to the rule of law damage the countrys investor climate, as does the governments refusal to allow foreign ownership of equity stakes in upstream oil and gas fields. Furthermore, Turkmenistans economy remains centrally planned and tightly controlled by the state. The country is ranked 174 out of 178 countries in the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. Only Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe have lower rankings.

A Gas Powerhouse Feels the Pinch

The Turkmen economys key sector is energy, mainly gas and oil, which reportedly account for 31 percent of GDP. A decline in hydrocarbon revenues has forced the government to cut back on subsidies, social spending, and public infrastructure. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has noted a steep slowdown in Turkmenistans GDP growth, which dropped from 14.7 percent in 2011 to 10.3 percent in 2014, and again to 6.5 percent in 2015, although the countrys penchant for secrecy calls into question these and all economic figures. The ADBs growth forecast for 2016 and 2017 is 5.5 percent.

Turkmenistan has the worlds fourthlargest natural gas reserves, but its geographic and political isolation limit its ability to export this resource, except to a handful of markets. Its neighborsAzerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistanall have ample supplies of gas of their own and compete with Ashgabat for access to gas markets, as does Russia. These countries generally have more favorable geographic locations for exporting hydrocarbons than Turkmenistan and are concentrating on building their own pipeline infrastructures to export their gas rather than work out gas transit arrangements with Ashgabat for the transshipment of Turkmen gas to the same markets.

As a result, Turkmenistan has become fully dependent on China for its gas sales, a dependence that has grown from zero in 2007, when the China National Petroleum Company first received a license to explore and extract onshore gas in Turkmenistan. It remains the only foreign company ever to acquire such rights. Ashgabats reliance on Beijing is based not on gas sales alone but also on Chinese financing for the energy infrastructure that extracts and exports gas via pipeline from Turkmenistan to China. Ashgabat reportedly took out $8 billion in loans in 2011 and another undisclosed sum in 2013, making Beijing its largest lender.

Chinese companies profit handsomely from these deals. They are actively involved in constructing pipeline and extraction infrastructure, often employing Chinese workers, who have clashed with locals who resent being relegated to secondary positions. In 2009, the China National Petroleum Company dismissed Turkmen workers who protested against wage arrears. Such Chinese practices limit the benefits of gasindustry development for most Turkmen workers.

Chinas economic influence in Turkmenistan far exceeds that of all other countries. Turkmen exports to China totaled USD 8.65 billion in 2014, while exports to Turkeythe countrys second most important marketamounted to a mere USD 567 million. Ashgabat is paying off its large debt to China by providing Beijing with gas at severely depressed prices. This is clearly seen when one compares the prices of Chinas two leading providers of gas: Turkmenistan is Chinas top supplier, reportedly selling Beijing gas at USD 185 per 1,000 cubic meters. By contrast, AustraliaBeijings secondlargest suppliersells natural gas in its liquefied form (LNG) to China at UDS 220 per 1,000 cubic meters.

Beijing clearly enjoys enormous negotiating leverage over Ashgabat. But with Turkmenistans economy in sharp decline, China has to exercise caution in how it uses that leverage. Reduced inflows into the Turkmen state budget have resulted in a devalued currency, wage arrears, food shortages and rationing, and the cutting of subsidies. The government imposed currency controls as an anticrisis measure, but the move led to inflation and huge blackmarket trade in dollars.

Unemployment is soaring. Officially, the unemployment rate is 10.5 percent, although unofficial estimates put the real figure at around 50 percent. Underemployment is a vexing problem, particularly in rural areas where many Turkmen are engaged in subsistence farming.

The economic downturn in Turkmenistan has led to growing popular dissatisfaction and occasional outbursts of socioeconomic protest and dissentrarities considering the oppressive nature of the government. Given its economic equities in Turkmenistan, China should weigh the risks of receiving cheap gas and recouping its loans, on the one hand, versus the potential for social and political instability in the country, on the other.

Beyond Energy

In addition to energy, agriculturemainly wheat and cottonis an important sector of the Turkmen economy, employing roughly half of the countrys population even though agriculture accounts for only 13 percent of GDP. The World Bank estimates that only 4.1 percent of the countrys territory is arable land. Most agriculture occurs on artificially irrigated landa problem given regional water shortages and the fact that 95 percent of the countrys water comes from upstream countries.

Turkmenistan is the only Central Asian state that has increased the amount of land under irrigation since independence. Yet, this expansion of irrigation is primarily for agriculture and has done little to close the gap in providing the population with quality drinking water. Poor water management and outdated infrastructure and irrigation technologies prevent 40 percent of the population from accessing potable water from a reliable source. Even in the capital, infrastructure breakdowns create shortages of drinking water, forcing some residents to use buckets to retrieve a daily supply. Water shortages and climate change will also have longterm negative effects on Turkmen agriculture.

Turkmenistan is Eurasias secondlargest cotton exporter after Uzbekistan, yet the quality of its raw cotton and yield have declined in the postSoviet era due to poor irrigation and management practices. Forced labor and child labor in cotton fields have led consumer and human rights groups to call for corporate boycotts of Turkmen cotton, and several companies have done so. International clothing retailer H&M has stopped buying Turkmen cotton, and global retailer IKEA has limited its sourcing in Turkmenistan to one supplier, increased training and monitoring of the farms that sell to that supplier, and publicly pledged not to import any product made with Turkmen cotton into the United States or the United Kingdom.

Turkmen agriculture is organized around peasant associations, which farm the vast majority of cultivated land. However, these associations lack the freedom to decide what they can produce. The state instead provides them with orders and requires them to sell their products back to the state. The government has prioritized cotton, wheat, sugar beets, and rice as strategic crops; the latter three are seen as key elements of Turkmenistans desire to become food secure and rely less on imports from its neighbors.

However, with inflation at 6 percent and the currency losing 19 percent of its value in 2015, food insecurity plagues the population as subsidies dry up, prices for basic goods skyrocket, and purchasing power declines. In November 2016, the government issued an updated law on food security, calling for the agricultural sector to focus on providing basic foodstuffs. The vague new law is likely a response to growing anger in the country over food shortages, but it remains unclear what impact the legislation will have on improving the countrys food stocks and alleviating hunger.

Although Berdimuhamedov reopened regional hospitals, the country still cannot provide basic human security for its citizens, which is evident in the countrys health statistics. Given food shortages, malnutrition in the country will probably worsen; it likely already contributes to Turkmenistan having the highest child mortality rate in the former Soviet Union. Turkmenistans infant mortality rate in 2015 rate was 44 per 1,000 births, and the underfive mortality ratethe probability of dying between birth and age fivewas 51 per 1,000 births. By comparison, neighboring Iran and Kazakhstan share a much lower infant mortality rate of 13 per 1,000 births, while their underfive mortality rates were 16 and 14 per 1,000 births respectively. Uzbekistans 2015 infant mortality and underfive mortality rates were also better than Turkmenistans, at 34 and 39 per 1,000 births.

As with economic figures, the countrys secretive nature raises doubts about the accuracy of available health data. Heart disease, tuberculosis, and diarrheal diseases are among the top causes of death in Turkmenistan, which is also a highburden country for multipledrugresistant tuberculosis. According to official numbers, at least 15 percent of new TB cases and 34 percent of repeat cases are multiple drug resistant. An outbreak of hepatitis A in Turkmen schools was reported in November 2016, but the government lacked adequate stocks of the hepatitis A vaccine. Amid high inflation and a devalued currency, the price of common medicines is skyrocketing, with consumers facing price increases of between 80 and 120 percent in January 2017 alone.

But statistics likely do not tell the whole story, and the public health situation is probably even worse, because Turkmenistan refuses to share recent health and disease statisticsincluding healthcare expenditurewith the World Health Organization. Turkmenistan rarely reports any new cases of HIV infection, although drug addiction has plagued the country, raising questions about prevalence of the disease. The government has made reducing addiction and combating drug trafficking public priorities. Without verifiable statistics, however, it is unclear whether any of Turkmenistans health or antidrug policies are bearing fruit.

The Limits of Turkmen Foreign Policy

An outlier in Central Asia, Turkmenistan has long resisted the regional trend of pursuing a multivector foreign policy that balances between Russia, China, and the West. Ashgabat instead chose the path of permanent neutrality, a status the UN endorsed in 1995. The goal of this policy was to help the country resist pressure from outside powers, but it also allowed Turkmenistan to justify its relationship in the 1990s and 2000s with Taliban and Afghan drug traffickers. From this period to today, some Turkmen government officials have reportedly been complicit in trafficking drugs and other illicit goods.

Permanent neutrality has helped Ashgabat avoid membership in Russiansponsored integration projects such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization or the Eurasian Economic Union. Turkmenistan is the only Central Asian state that is not a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Although Ashgabat did sign up for NATOs Partnership for Peace program in 1994, its ties to the alliance have mostly been symbolic, particularly during the Niyazov era. By keeping its distance from both Russia and the West, Turkmenistan has prevented itself from becoming an object in any geopolitical tussle between the two. But the stance also means Ashgabat has few defenders in Moscow, Washington, or Brussels, and has little to offer the outside world except its gas.

The end result of Turkmenistans position has been the perpetuation of an isolated regime that is only partly integratedthrough Chinainto the global economy and international system. The countrys reticence to join regional bodies also hampers its ability to deal with transnational issues. This could become a bigger problem as many of the greatest threats to the countrys stabilitydrug trafficking, violent extremism, water shortages, and regional instabilityrequire transnational approaches.

Ashgabats relationship with Moscow since independence has been strained by frictions over gas pricing and the mistreatment of ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan. Until the Chinesefinanced Central AsiaChina pipeline opened in December 2009, Turkmenistans gas exports were highly vulnerable to Russian pressure, with Russian energy giant Gazprom controlling the only pipeline built in the Soviet era to transport natural gas from Central Asia to markets. This made Russia the primary destination for the majority of Turkmenistans gas exports. As both a producer of natural gas and a pipeline operator, Gazprom, with Kremlin support, long favored exporting its own gas to lucrative markets in Europe. In doing so, the company relegated Turkmenistan to being a gas provider to countries in the former Soviet spacemany of which defaulted on payments in the 1990s and early 2000s. Gaspricing disputes between Ashgabatbased Turkmengas and Gazprom have vexed the TurkmenRussian relationship ever since.

Russia was once the main export market for Turkmen gas, but a pipeline explosion in April 2009 stopped the transportation of Turkmen gas to Russia for the remainder of the year. Gas exports resumed in 2010, and the two countries agreed that Gazprom would buy Turkmen gas at $240 per 1,000 cubic meters and either resell it or use it domestically in Russia. Gas prices, however, have since fallen, prompting Gazprom to seek to renegotiate the terms, including through international arbitration. Under pressure from cheaper suppliers of gas, Gazprom drastically reduced the volume of gas purchased from Turkmenistan from 10.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2014 to 4 bcm in 2015.

In January 2016, Gazprom announced it had stopped importing Turkmen gas altogether and would seek USD 5 billion in reimbursements through arbitration for having overpaid for inflated Turkmen gas supplies. Until these issues are settled, Gazprom is unlikely to resume imports of Turkmen gas; it has made that clear by launching talks with Uzbekneftegaz about increasing imports from neighboring Uzbekistanprobably a Russian attempt to court new Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and pull Tashkent closer to Moscow.

Russia is now trying to increase its role and presence in the region. To this end, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Ashgabat in June 2016 for talks on weapons sales, security cooperation, Afghan instability, and the threat of the Islamic State moving to the region. Russian government officials and the Russian media often amplify external terrorist threats to Turkmenistan and its neighbors in an attempt to bolster security ties with Central Asian states and justify a greater role for Russia in the region.

Ashgabat has frosty relations with the West. Its relationship with NATO lacked substance until Berdimuhamedovs presidency. However, Turkmenistans cooperation with the alliance toward the end of the U.S. presidency of George W. Bush and at the start of that of Barack Obama was facilitated by common concerns over instability emanating from Afghanistan and Turkmenistans desire to diversify its energy exports through its neighbor to densely populated South Asia. Under Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan participated in training programs to improve border security and combat drug and other illicit trafficking from Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan had limited participation in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), through which NATO supplied its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Ashgabats participation in the NDN was not all altruistic, as the network was lucrative for elites across Eurasia, including the Turkmen regime. However, NATOs drawdown from Afghanistan since January 2015 has led to rising instability there, particularly in the AfghanTurkmen frontier zone in the north of the country. In Afghanistans Faryab province, which borders Turkmenistan, Afghan security forces struggled in 2015 and 2016 to cope with an uptick of Taliban militants, foreign fighters, and paramilitary forces. The Taliban has also been increasingly active in Afghanistans Jowzjan, Badghis, and Herat provincesall of which also border Turkmenistan.

Turkmen security forces have been forced to engage militants, not always successfully, along the 460mile border. Turkmen border guards have been killed and even reportedly refused to fight back when militants pushed over the frontier, raising questions about the skill level and ability of these forces to protect the state from outside threats. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, among others, has highlighted this border as one of Central Asias weak points, and Russia pledged military assistance after twentyseven Turkmen soldiers allegedly died in a border skirmish in May 2016.

Turkmenistans poor military readiness and need for more capable leadership in the armed forces likely played into Berdimuhamedovs October 2015 decisions to appoint the head of the countrys security service as minister of defense and to call up reservists to serve in border regions. The government has also launched a rearmament program to modernize its military capabilities.

The West has little leverage to push its agenda in Turkmenistan. The countrys bizarre personalityfocused political system, dismal democracy deficit, and poor investor climate limit Western economic interest and involvement there. International criticism of the Turkmen government has done little to improve its behavior, in part because the leadership is wary of any attempts by outsiders to meddle in its internal affairs. A decade ago, Washington and Brussels hoped that Turkmenistan could become the easternmost flank of the European Unions Southern Gas Corridor to reduce European states dependence on Russian energy. Instead, Turkmen gas has found a market in China.

The RussiaUkraine conflict and reinvigorated EU efforts to find alternative supplies of gas have led to renewed talk of a transCaspian pipeline to transport gas under the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and beyond to Turkey and southern Europe. While such a route would help diversify Turkmenistans gas exports and Europes suppliers, there have long been numerous political, financial, and environmental hurdles. The difficult relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan has improved in recent years, but the two countries have traditionally had acrimonious relations due to a longstanding maritime border dispute, with both countries claiming the same lucrative gas and oil field in the Caspian Sea.

Maritime disputes in the Caspian Sea, fluctuating gas prices, objections from other Caspian littoral states, and the technical difficulties and costs of constructing a transCaspian pipeline remain impediments to its realization. Russia, in particular, strongly objects to any pipeline across the Caspian Sea, as it would provide an alternative to the Russian pipeline infrastructure to transport Central Asian gas to Europe. Neither Ashgabat nor Baku appears willing to test Russia on the transCaspian pipeline, nor do they have more than the Wests rhetorical backing to do so. Russias aggressive defense of what it sees as its vital interests in the region, which clearly includes the Caspian Sea, make realizing the pipeline highly unlikely.

Until Turkmenistan halted gas supplies to Iran on January 1, 2017, in a payment dispute for gas delivered between 2007 and 2008, Tehran was the only other importer of Turkmen natural gas, which was delivered through two pipelinesone built in 1997 and the other in 2010. Turkmenistan, however, has received little revenue for these exports. Due to international sanctions against Iran, Tehran paid Turkmenistan through a gasforgoods barter arrangementa problem for cashstarved Turkmenistan, given that it was expecting to export USD 30 billion worth of gas to Iran over the next ten years. The 2014 international deal on Irans nuclear program has the potential to transform the trade relationship if the removal of sanctions on Iran eventually allows for direct payments for gas.

However, Iran has enormous gas reserves of its own for its domestic use and export. It has begun tapping these reserves and building up infrastructure to supply northern parts of the country that have depended on Turkmen gas imports with domestic sources, which will eventually negate the need for Turkmen gas in Iran. Given this reality, the collapse of the negotiations on reaching a settlement of the longstanding payment dispute in which Ashgabat claims Tehran owes it the equivalent of USD 1.8 billion in arrearsjeopardizes future gas trading relationships between the two countries. In coming years, Iran aims to become a competitor to Turkmenistan in global gas markets, and its geographic locationbetween Europe and South Asia, with access to the Persian Gulfprovides it with easier access than Turkmenistan to key markets.

Certainly Not a Regional Center

The Turkmen government has aspirations to transform the country into a regional hub, connecting Central Asia to the Caucasus via the Caspian, to the Persian Gulf via Iran, and to markets in South Asia via Afghanistan. However, unlike other Eurasian states that border Iran and enjoy extensive trading ties with that country, there is little tourism or shuttle trade between Turkmenistan and Iran, due to the Turkmen governments efforts to keep the country closed to outside influences.

At the same time, Turkmenistan is constructing its leg of the TurkmenAfghanTajik railroad and selling electricity to Afghanistan. In late 2014, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan inaugurated a railroad link connecting Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. However, Turkmenistan has limited trading ties with its neighbors and faces competition from them in its endeavor to become a regional hub: all Central Asian states see themselves as central nodes in a future regional transportation and distribution network and are eager to attract Chinese investment to develop those projects.

Ashgabat is particularly eager to see the construction of the TurkmenistanAfghanistanPakistanIndia (TAPI) pipeline, a 1,118mile pipeline capable of transporting 33 bcm of gas per year. Costing an estimated USD 10 billion, the proposed pipeline has an uncertain future due to financing difficulties, the deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a lack of interest from major international energy companies. These corporations are hesitant to invest in Turkmenistan because of its poor investment climate and unwillingness to allow them to hold equity stakes in Turkmen gas fields.

The TAPI pipelines current estimated cost is four times greater than what the Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecast in 2002. The ADB and the Islamic Development Bank have promised to help with financing, but it remains unclear from where the additional funds will come for a pipeline that runs through one of the worlds most unstable regions. Parts of the proposed pipeline would go through areas under Taliban control or traverse Pakistans volatile Balochistan region. That increases doubts about whether construction will proceed and whether the pipeline can ultimately serve as a viable and reliable means to deliver gas to South Asia, particularly as more LNGincluding from Qatarcomes online. Turkmenistan has tried to minimize its ties to many of its Central Asian neighbors, although its desire to be a regional hub has created opportunities for increased trade and transportation linkages.

Turkmenistan cooperated with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the Central AsiaChina pipeline, and Turkmen gas now transits both states on its way to China. The promise of a lucrative windfall to all three states from that pipeline has led to improved relations with both. In big regional argumentssuch as water shortagesTurkmenistan has clashed with upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over their plans to increase hydroelectricity output and construct dams.

A Bleak Future

Turkmenistans bizarre system of governance has left the country isolated economically, politically, and culturally. It has been the most stagnant state in the former Soviet space for the past twentyfive years. The Turkmen government continues to isolate its citizens from all outside influences, but the costs of this isolation are high. Turkmenistan faces multiple external threats and has limited capacity to manage them. Those threats include water shortages and climate change, food security, rising instability in Afghanistan, a Russia that is willing and able to intervene in neighboring states to defend its interests, and a West that shows less and less interest in the country. Deeply in debt to China, Turkmenistan is in a subservient position to Beijing as a supplier of gas at a steep discount to the worlds secondlargest economy. Ties with Iran are tense, and relations with the regions other important playersAzerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistanappear stable but are far from warm.

Turkmenistans economic situation will most likely continue to decline due to a prolonged lull in hydrocarbon prices, growing competition in global gas markets, and an irrational fear of opening up to the outside world. Turkmenistans elite has mismanaged and squandered much of the countrys resources, leaving it cash starved. The Turkmen government can no longer afford to placate the population with generous subsidies, and the social safety net has collapsed, raising questions about basic human security.

Niyazovs dismantling of the Soviet education system and his frequent purges of the government and political elites have lowered the skill level of the countrys technocrats, leading to a shortage of qualified workers capable of managing Turkmenistans growing internal and external problems. It is a sad legacy that endangers the countrys longterm stability and will plague its future for years to come.

This material is based on work supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

:: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace
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